1: Coon E-5 (1926-1927) 1931 MX3 Rif MX3

252 Any oil remaining over the three or four cups so given is the property of the man who
[735] has pressed it, unless a poor man without trees comes to the press and asks for some. Such demands cannot be refused and each suppliant must be given a cup.

241 Besides charitable assistance and work done in anticipation of remunerative charity,
465 there are two types of definite agricultural contract by which one man who has not enough land to support himself and his family may acquire sufficient provender to last his household through the winter. The first is that by which a poor man binds himself to assist a richer farmer in all agricultural tasks in which he may engage. In return for this he receives a fifth of the total grain crop, a fourth of the leguminous plants and vegetables harvested, a third of the product of the fruit, olive, and nut trees, and a third of the grapes.

The rich farmer hires these share-laborers (who are called *akhemes*,[1] plural *ikhemesen* or "fifths," because of their return in grain) because he is not able to care for all of his land himself, owing to its extensive size. If the property of a rich farmer is so extensive that he is unable to cultivate it with the aid of one share-laborer, he will hire two, and these will split a fifth, a fourth, and a third of the various types of produce. No matter how many men a farmer employs he never gives more than the stipulated fractions, which are equally divided among the workers.

241 When a man owns property which he has no intention of working himself, he can rent it
427 out in return for one half of the produce. This type of contract is used by the Beni Bu Yahyi in renting out the northerly portions of their territory to farmers who come down from Galiya to work the land, the Beni Bu Yahyi not being as interested in agriculture.

241 The share-laborer is often a stranger in the village of his employment, having left his
166 home through shame of having his poverty advertised in his own village, or more often through fear of punishment for some crime. The migrations of these share-laborers has done more to cause infiltrations of blood from tribe to tribe than any other factor, since the immigrant usually marries into the group of his adoption.

241 Wealth is not a stable thing in the Rif, any more than it is in more modern types of
556 society. Despite charitable practices and opportunities for outside work, many families find themselves on the verge of starvation in or near January and February, and are willing to sell anything within reason to obtain enough food to last them until the next harvest. Others, more industrious, who have worked their land to its limit and spent the rest of their time helping others for pay, may have more food than they require and be willing to sell some of it, at a premium. They generally demand land in payment. Working this land to its limit the following year, they may pile up an even greater surplus than before, and thus before many years may become large landowners and relatively rich men, ready, in their turn, to hire share-laborers the people from whom they bought the land.

[558] Thus the retention of property depends upon whether or not it is worked diligently, and positions of wealth may be reversed in less than a generation.

FOOD PREPARATION AND EATING

252 The different types of food, including their methods of preparation, may be classified as follows: (1) cereal preparations antedating bread, (2) bread and breadmaking, (3) preparation of vegetable products alone, (4) dishes containing meat, (5) fish, (6) eggs, (7) milk and

[1] The feminine form of this word signifies a political division. See p. 92.

representative), while among the Shluh Berbers of the Western Atlas and among the Rgaybat Bedouins of the Western Sahara, women can be their own ukilat (fem. pl. of ukil), although they cannot represent other women, as I once saw in Ibuqquyen (West-Central Rif)[66]...Rifian women may visit their families whenever they want to, and, in general, if Berber women are not given the same treatment and value as men are, they do, nonetheless, have certain advantages which derive from their status as minors.....In the Rif, women's markets are an example of this: they are meeting places completely free from men, where transactions take place, where brides are looked for, where amulets are bought and where news of the day is heard and spread. But a woman in the Rif, if she passes a man on a path, must always give him the right of way: she greets him first, lets him have the right of way, and continues on the lower part of the path....Rifian women love their children.

E) Property (fragmentary notes):

In the buying and selling of individual property, the jma'th (used here in the sense of council) did not intervene; the only parties concerned were the buyer, the seller, two 'udul (notaries public) and the qadi, the latter three individuals having to draw up and sign the necessary document. Even in the case of jma'th property[67], the jma'th did not intervene; once again, the 'udul drew up the documents in question....In the event of renting land, in which a document is not needed, the petition is handed to the village mqaddim (headman) who convokes the jma'th and agrees to the conditions. The same applies in case of mortgages....In case the petitioner does not fulfill his

621 423 11) Estate: The rural estate must be considered as being formed by the funds and property which the members of the jma'th looked after and which are mentioned in Section (5) above, and those which they used in common, such as lands and fruit trees, water, brushwood, pasturage, etc., (all) comprising the patrimony of the jma'th, given the fact that all of these were administered freely by the latter, and that they originated in it and invested in it, although toward different means and ends, as we shall try to show.

794 793 a) Worship: The attentions to worship, in any tribe, presented two aspects which were cared for in different ways. One was that regarding all pertaining to the mosque as a building, dhamzyidha (construction, repairs and maintenance), and the other was that of the personage who officiated within it: the fqih. The re- [423] sources on which both depended had the same origin: the intangible patrimony of the mosque formed by voluntary donations of well-to-do and pious individuals, consisting of lands and fruit trees, the working of which through leasing and the acquisition of graves in the vicinity of the mosque constituted its income.

794 [429] [251] The administration of these properties was the job of a lay member of the community, who was nominated by it and to which he had to account. The storeroom for grain was the ghurfa (Rif. ghwarfth), the second story, or any other room of the dhamzyidha or mosque, the key of which was kept by the mqaddim just mentioned, while the fiqh was its guard.

427 241 621 When plowing-time arrived, the patrimony was leased at a meeting of the jma'th, and when it was time for the harvest, each

[See p. 183--Analyst]

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621 person took to the storeroom the share of grain which had been allotted to him.

The fqih was contracted and paid through this share of
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623 grain. The mqaddim's job was gratuitous and was reduced to the ac-
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793 quisition of mats, lighting, buckets, brooms, small repairs, the
622 storing of the harvest and the payment of the fqih, with due notice
794 given to the jma'th. For other expenses, such as additions and im-
623 provements on the building, etc., there had to be prior agreement on
621
613 the part of the jma'th, i.e. acceptance of these matters by the various lineage heads.

From this simple mechanism and the character of these
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423 properties resulted their scrupulous and austere administration by lay tribesmen (author's italics), which any other procedure would have been hard put to surpass. The result was that not only were the summary needs of this sort, today unsettled, catered to, but that it was rare to find a mosque which did not possess surplus stores good for five or six years. Hence this constituted a true estate, a localistic tie which everyone voluntarily tried to improve and which today it is possible that we (i.e. the Spanish administration) have disrupted.

It has been said that our (i.e. the Spanish) occupation
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794 and action have forced the discovery and have focused upon habus
177 (religious and/or charitable endowment) properties which were either hidden or were on the point of disappearance. In the (tribal) countryside, this is either an error or an infantilism. Not only have we (the administration) discovered nothing of the sort, but we have confused things a great deal, as anyone who reads this paper, or rather, anyone

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423 The Rifian admits anything which constitutes instruction or improvement; but naturally he wants no part of any division of his
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648 holdings with strangers. This blessing of water which the official organ (i.e. the Spanish administration) as well as individuals receive, although the latter do so only to a limited degree, is not a product of technique, profitable or exemplary work as new developments would be, possible economic outlets or improvements in the present distributive net, but utilization of native labor in the style of some early-day amghar.

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648 Rare are the days of the Makhzin irrigation turn in which the
685 Makhazniya does not present us (i.e. the administration) with some
[427] miserable akhammas[123] accused of the terrible crime of having been surprised at night attempting to lead up a thread of water into his tiny, dried-up holding, a crystalline fiber which, if it even arrives there to irrigate, only God knows; and the nubth which the Europeans derive from it, dispute from it and gain from it, did not cost them the least effort to lead up nor did they do anything other than wait sitting down while the Makhzin appropriated it. And in such a case neither the Makhzin nor the European stands to gain anything; to the contrary, they have much to lose.

F) Irrigation in the Plain of Al-Husaima:

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675 The usage of irrigation water from the Lower Ghis and Nkur Rivers has been, since time immemorial, the object of individual agreements among the irrigators, agreements which are usually put down in writing, for the flow of water, although variable, permits a regular distribution through permanent ditches, a distribution known

243 sickles and the women carrying the grain stalks to the threshing areas. The threshing floors are generally merely a circle of dirt ground, although in some areas they are paved. The stalks [231] are placed on this circular floor and mules, donkeys, or cattle are driven about inside the circle, trampling the grain and separating it from the chaff. The grain is further refined by hand-winnowing done by the women. The straw is accumulated in circu- [231] lar stacks to be preserved as food for the animals during the winter months. When relatives have worked a common piece of land 243 465 the yield is divided by measuring off the appropriate amount of grain in straw baskets. If the division is on a one-for-one basis, each alternate basket will go to one of the parties. If the division is at some other ratio, the number of baskets will accordingly be at that ratio. If the land was ploughed, planted [427] and harvested by a akhammas, a sharecropping laborer, the owner of the land will receive four bushels out of every five, the remaining fifth going to the akhammas.

241 Throughout the summer the vegetables, fruits and nuts are harvested as they come ripe. In late summer and early autumn the [465] maize and grapes are harvested. Once again, if the labor of several families or of akhammas has been involved, straw baskets are used to allot out to each man his appropriate portion. It is 585 during this period, in the months of August and September, that 221 [241] weddings are held. The agricultural cycle has been completed and there is spare time to arrange the necessary items for a wedding. Also this is the period in which the optimum amount of food is

584 pick out a prospective husband and let it be known among her
[521] circle of girl friends that she likes him. Within the community such information is conveyed through gossip so that it becomes knowledge among the women in both the girl's and boy's family. If the boy is interested he may ask his mother or grandmother to urge the male members of his family to talk to the girl's father. Such procedure occurs only among the poor, who are, however, the majority.

584 562 586 Men have more say about their prospective spouse because of the fear of divorce. Since the male has the option of initiating divorce proceedings, it is thought unwise to force a son into a marriage that he strenuously opposes, since all the advantages that accrue from the match are terminated at its rupture.

584 [782] [571] Westermarck (1914:50-51) notes that among the Beni Wariyghar if a man wishes to marry a girl and his father opposes the match, the son can sacrifice a sheep outside the parental home, placing an obligatory duty (<u>'ar</u>) on the father. He remarks that the Riffians do not regard this as a good method for obtaining a wife. I encountered no case of this occurring. I do know of [593] instances in which the son has married against the father's will [464] and has been kicked off the land. In such cases the men work as [421] <u>akhammas</u> or migrate abroad in search of wage labor. In such circumstances shame is thought to fall on both parties.

584 581 582 Aside from the preferences of the couple, it is supposed that a certain amount of advantage stems from marrying a relative which is counterbalanced by disadvantages. My informants agreed

256 the mill collects a tenth of all the flour he processes, regard-
435 less of the level of demand or any market condition. While mills
472 are not economically competitive with one another, they are soci-
256 ally competitive. As one informant put it: "My father was better
472 than his, my grandfather better than his grandfather. If he has
477 a mill, why shouldn't we?" If there is only one mill in a local-
ity, which is a fairly rare circumstance, the entire community
uses it. However, if there are two or more mills, the basis of
[571] preference on the part of the users is not determined by conveni-
[578] ence of location of the mill but in terms of social factors such
[602] as either ancient antagonisms stemming from the blood feuds of
the past or familial alliance based on marriage or kinship.

Just as social motives and strictures lie behind the uses
423 of capital, so too do they influence the regulation of labor.
427 We see this in a series of sharecropping associations which arise
between a man who has more property than he alone can personally
cultivate (or who is prohibited from manual labor by his social
and/or religious status, such as some shorfa) and a person who
holds less land than he can cultivate to meet the subsistence
needs of his family. The latter may or may not be a property
holder, although usually he does have a small plot of his own.
Land fragmentation through the peculiarities of Islamic inher-
itance has, however, reduced many plots to sizes too small to
meet such subsistence needs as a family requires. In these cir-
[464] cumstances the Riffian hires out to those who have managed to
keep larger estates or have acquired land through purchase.

423 The number of men under such association is difficult to estimate
427 though I have the impression it is large. No man whom I inter-
464 viewed who might be roughly classified as a leader in the community had less than one person working for him in such a relationship.

427 The most prominent and common association is that of the
464 akhammas or sharecroppers. The akhammas is a laborer who voluntarily contracts to contribute all the physical labor necessary for the total production process of a piece of land. The landowner provides the land itself, the seed, fertilizer, plough and any other equipment, and the animal power. The akhammas provides all labor, from the initial ploughing to the ultimate harvesting.
[465] For his services he receives exactly one-fifth of the yield,
[466] hence the name which derives from hamsa or 'five.' The akhammas also receives the hand-me-down clothes of the master and often a meal each day. Since the activities of the akhammas entail his
427 constant presence around or even inside the household, he has far
464 greater access to the wives of notables than other males. A man
562 of sufficient wealth to employ an akhammas would probably isolate his wife from contact with male society. It is a myth that the Berbers do not seclude their women. The only ones who are not secluded from male society are the wives of poor men who must contribute their labor to the production process. Such women are, of course, the vast majority. The akhammas has more contact with the wives of the notable class than any other male not closely related to the family. Since the akhammas must consult

427 464 562 [602] the wife about household tasks and often takes his meals inside the central patio, he is on rather intimate (for the Rif) terms with these women. In such a close and anomalous situation, there is a preference on the part of the master to hire a poor relative, especially of his wife, as a servant. By hiring a man of the wife's family or of a family which includes the wife's relatives by marriage, one lessens the danger of too close a relationship between wife and akhammas.

427 464 466 465 565 While both partners in the akhammas arrangement seek to establish a contract which is divorced from social conflict over women, they are nonetheless in basic conflict along incipient class lines. The akhammas, at least in the contemporary situation, regards himself as being exploited by his patron in that the wage scale is fixed and involves difficult manual labor without any guarantees of remmeration. While he is free to negotiate his contract with whomever he so desires, his wage depends directly on the size of the crop yield for any one year. The master with greater reserves of resources suffers only an inconvenience if the crop yield is low. The sharecropper, on the other hand, has few if any reserves, and any reduction in the portion of his share has serious repercussions on his ability to maintain his household. The akhammas is especially aware of the inequity of this arrangement as wage opportunities open up and he becomes aware that salary can be negotiated with commensurate rewards in cash. Most ikhammasen prefer to get into the category of wage

427 laborer, especially as a migrant worker in Europe or Algeria,
464 where salaries are high by Riffian standards.
465
466 On the other end of the spectrum are the landowners who
565 regard the akhammas as the true beneficiary of the association. They argue that since they provide all the elements of production except labor, they are being exploited by the working class. The akhammas provides only his manual labor for a few weeks of ploughing and again for a few weeks at harvest time. Their contention is that although the work is arduous, it spans over a relatively short period of time for which the akhammas receives enough to meet his subsistence needs for the year. The remainder of the year the akhammas is free to contract for such labor as is available. The property owner, however, depends exclusively on his crop and thus does not have the additional revenues which the worker earns throughout the rest of the year. If the crop yield is low, the master will always see to it that the worker gets something, and besides the poor can apply for government relief while the rich can not. I suggested to several owners that they [123] engage a wage laborer for the short duration of actual work involved in performing the cultivation tasks but was met with only stony silence at the notion of such a scheme. I did not encounter and no one ever spoke of an instance in which agricultural labor was paid for in daily or weekly wages. Since the property class is in a position to change the system but does not, presumably the akhammas arrangement works to their benefit.